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NOTES.
some states who would otherwise have a justifiable claim. However,
other states should be permitted to contest the right of the escheating
state to take or retain the property, either by a direct suit against the
state or in an interpleader action. The answer to the question of which
of the states has the superior right in a direct conflict between them can
only be determined by a balancing of the interests in any particular fact
situation. However, if and when a conflict among the enumdrated states
is presented to the Supreme Court, it would be desirable to choose one
controlling factor as determinative of who has the superior claim. Once
the choice of a controlling element is made, greater uniformity, stability,
and predictability can be attained.38 This choice should be the domi-
ciliary state of the last known owner,3 9 thereby providing more pro-
tection to the stockholders, who have the primary interest, and a more
equitable distributing of the funds among the states.
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act' in 1946 was universally
regarded as a needed step towards governmental responsibility for the
tortious conduct of its agents. In general, the purpose of the legislation
was to assimilate, in so far as practicable, the position of the government
in respect. to liability for the "negligent and wrongful acts" of its
employees, to that of a private employer. Congress, however, chose
to limit the relinquishment of its sovereign right and clearly indicated,
this intent by the inclusion of thirteen exceptions to the waiver of
immunity.
While the majority of the exceptions are directed to specific gov-
38. This solution is analogous to the technique used in the Conflict of Laws, where
one factor is often taken as determinative in order to provide uniformity in the
law. See, e.g., Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754 (1909);
Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 679, 119 N.E. 539 (1918); Garnett v. Boston &
M. Ry., 238 Mass. 125, 130 N.E. 183 (1921) (In actions ex delkto the law of the
state where the tort was committed governs the rights of the parties).
39. See Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property-A Proposed Model Act,
46 ILL. L. REv. 48, 75 (1951). Professor Shestack suggests a provision for escheat
by the domiciliary state of the last known owner.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (Supp. 1950).
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ernmental operations, 2 the first is couched in broad sweeping terminology
whereby liability is denied to :3
Any claim based . . . upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
The increasing frequency with which this exception is successfully
invoked in cases arising under the act makes desirable an inquiry as to
its meaning and possible justification.
Difficulty is encountered in ascertaining what Congress sought to
accomplish by the inclusion of this limitation. The committee reports
afford some indication by designating certain types of claims to which
the exception was intended to be applicable. Thus, recovery was to be
precluded in claims arising out of discretionary acts of the regulatory
agencies, 5 and for injuries sustained by reason of governmental opera-
tions in improving navigation or furthering flood control., Aside from
these specifically mentioned objectives, there is little intimation of legis-
lative intent; unless one includes the fact that Congress did not contem-
plate total abandonment of limitations against tort actions.
7
At least one writer, in reference to the discretionary exception, has
proposed that, ". . . the rationale underlying this concept is predicated
upon the well-recognized distinction between the acts of the Government
2. The exceptions dealing with specific agencies or specific operations of the gov-
ernment are: 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), post office; Id. (c), customs; Id. (d), admiralty
cases: Id. (e), Trading With The Enemy Act; Id. (f), quarantines; Id. (g), Panama
Canal; Id'. (i), fiscal operations of the Treasury Department and regulation of the mone-
tary system; Id. (j), military operations in time of war; Id. (1), Tennessee Valley Au-
thority; Id. (m), Panama Railway Corporation; Id. (h), liability for intentional torts,
and Id. (k), any claim arising in a foreign country.
3. The portion quoted is preceded by the clause: "Any claim based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid," which
would seem to be independent of the discretionary function clause. Boyce v. United
States, 93 F.Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950). The first clause was probably inserted to
except suits based solely on the claim that a statute or regulation is unconstitutional,
and hence, that the acts arising from such statute or regulation are wrongful. Con-
gress felt that a tort action was not a proper means of testing the constitutionality of
legislation. H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942).
4. 60 STAT. 845, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946).
5. H.R. RE'. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945).
6. Ibid. This committee report, however, refers to the whole of Sec. 2680(a) and
congressional reference to flood control and navigation claims may have been directed
to the first clause rather than the discretionary function exception. That is, the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act was not intended as a substitute for the traditional remedy of
a taking within the Fifth Amendment. See note 2 supra.
7. "The right to sue the Government which would be granted by the bill is sur-
rounded by certain safeguards and circumscribed by certain limitations." H.R. REP. No.
1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
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'qua government' and those of a proprietary nature, the courts holding
the sovereign harmless in the former case." 8
This is said to find support in the fact that many of the earlier
bills introduced in Congress omitted this principle, on the theory that
the courts would read into the act the substance of the exception. 9
Actually, this has occurred under T.V.A.'s "sue and be sued on" clause,
which is silent as to any exceptions. The courts have interpreted this
clause to permit an action only for harms resulting from proprietary
functions. 10 However, the description of the immunity retained in terms
of "discretionary functions" would indicate a differing scope than one
based on the governmental-proprietary dichotomy. That an official is
performing acts in the governmental category would not prescribe the
acts as discretionary,"- and similarly, functions which are proprietary
or corporate in nature are not necessarily ministerial. 12 Thus, whatever
the rationale underlying the exception, its coverage would seem to be"
derived from the meahing to be accorded the phrase "discretionary func-
tion."
Although intrinsically so vague as to be almost meaningless, it is sig-
nificant that the terms, discretionary and ministerial, have a history of
application in other legal contexts. For example, the discretionary test
has been employed to determine whether mandamus will issue to compel
action by a governmental officer.' 3  More important for purposes of
8. Gottlieb. The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO.
LJ. 1, 42 (1946).
9. ". . . It is likely that the cases embraced within that subsection [Sec. 2680
(a) ] would have been exempted by judicial construction. H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
10. In Grant v. T. V. A., 49 F.Supp. 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1942), the court said the
clause did not perriit plaintiff to sue for damages from flood control and navigation
activities (governmental activities), but did permit suit for damages from T. V. A.'s
commercial activities such as generating and selling electricity. Pacific National Fire
Ins. v. T. V. A., 89 F.Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1949).
11. "Probably no function of a municipal corporation is more 'governmental' in
character than the care of its highways, streets, and bridges. In theory, therefore,
the city should be immune from responsibility for negligence in such matters; and
such was the common law. Precisely the opposite result, however, constitutes the
weight of judicial authority in this country on the commonly advanced ground that
the duty of taking care of the public highways is ministerial in character." Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229 (1925).
12. Although proprietary and ministerial have been used interchangeably by some
courts; e.g., in cases of tort liability of municipal corporations, by definition they
cannot be synonymous. Proprietary refers to a function in the sense that the function
resembles that of private business. A test for this may be whether the activity is
producing a profit- or is competing with private business. Ministerial, on the other
hand, designates an act which involves a small degree of judgihent in performance
and which posits a duty to perform upon the official or government.
13., Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838); Decatur
v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (U.S. 1840) , Sherwood, Mandamus To Review State Ad-
ininistratlive Action, 45 MIcH. L. Rxv. 123, 139 (1946).
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the exception, the discretionary test generally has been the criterion for
determination of personal liability and immunity of government offi-
cials.14 An official may be held responsible for an injurious act which
was merely ministerial; but is immune if the injury arose from an act
which was discretionary in nature.15 By relating this accepted immunity
of officials to the discretionary function exception, the immunity waived
by the Federal Tort Claims Act would extend only to instances where
respondeat superior is applicable, and would exclude situations where
personal liability does not attach to the officer or employee performing
the act.' 6 If this constitutes the coverage of the exception, an examina-
tion of the manner in which the test has been applied in litigation involv-
ing tort immunity and liability of government officials is necessary.
Broadly speaking, the courts have designated as ministerial, official
action which is absolute, certain, and imperative.' 7 Discretionary action,
on the other hand, has been characterized as that which necessarily
requires the exercise of reasoning and judgment in deciding whether
action is to, be taken or in what manner it is t6 be performed.' 8 More
concrete factors aid in ascertaining the nature of an official's function.
Thus, the language of the statute authorizing the action is important,
and often controlling. If the time, mode, and occasion is prescribed,
the activity will likely be considered as miniisterial, while, if these
factors are to be determined by the official, the activity will probably
be discretionary.' 9 The use of mandatory or permissive language in
the statute may influence the court's decision.20  The position or im-
portance of the official performing the act may also be persuasive. 21
However, none of these considerations are conclusive, and the test is at
best, abstract and extremely difficult to apply with any semblance of
certainty.22
14. Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (U.S. 1804); Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App.
D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135 (1938); Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189
Pac. 462 (1920) ; PRoss-R, TORTS § 108(c) (1941).
15. See note 14 supra.
16. Kendrick v. United States, 82 F.Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949); accord, Coates
v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
17. People v. May, 251 Ill. 54, 95 N.E. 999 (1911); Wailes v. Smith, 76 Md.
469, 25 Atl. 922 (1893) ; Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 89 Pac. 772 (1907) ; HART, AN
INTRODUCrION To ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 278 (2d ed. 1950).
18. See authorities cited in note 17 supra. Also see Stewart v. Stewart, 28 Ind.
App. 378, 62 N.E. 1023 (1901) ; State v. Tindell, 112 Kan. 256, 210 Pac. 619 (1922).
19. Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 Micn. L. REV. 848,
853 (1921).
20. Id. at 876.
21. Id. at 862; HART, op. cit. su pra note 16, at 259.
22. "Such statements [distinguishing ministerial and discretionary functions] would
seem to postulate a class of official acts in which the official is an automaton; the
facts and the statute are placed in a machine, a lever is pressed, and out comes the
NOTES
This lack of objective criteria has permitted the introduction of
policy considerations in deciding the nature of a particular function.
Thus, in the adjudication of personal liability of the officials, the courts
have been influenced by a desire to grant immunity, and, consequently,
have liberally construed acts as discretionary, regardless of the hardships
on individual citizens. The rationale of this official immunity can be
traced to sound and practical arguments, 23 which include: (1) Indi-
viduals would be deterred from accepting government offices if forced
to assume the risk of personal financial loss. (2) Officials would not be
free to exercise independent judgment, since the fear of law suits would
discourage their acting or possibly -intimidate them to act other than
on the basis of sound discretion. (3) The mere time and effort expended
in defending such suits would render the official incapable of performing
his duties fully and efficiently. (4) Breach of such duties should be
redressed through criminal prosecutions or at the election polls. (5) It
is basically unfair to hold an official liable for an act which the legis-
lature has authorized or granted him power to perform.
These arguments were more persuasive prior to the Federal Tort
Claims Act since the financial burden of tort liability was borne entirely
by the official. The government was protected by sovereign immunity
from the principle of respondeat superior which is applicable in similar
situations in the business world.
If these same considerations apply with equal force to governmental
tort immunity, it seems that the courts necessarily should give the dis-
cretionary function exception a scope comparable to that found in the
suits against government officials. However, that they are not so appli-
cable is apparent. It cannot be maintained that citizens would be dis-
couraged from accepting public office because of a realization that their
wrongful acts would create liability in the government. Nor would
officials be particularly deterred from acting, or intimidated into improper
acts through fear of a suit against the government.2 4 Efficiency would
official act. Such official never was on land or sea. Human action always involves
the exercise of some judgment or discretion ... One might infer that the courts
have no law on the subject of discretionary powers. That each case is decided sub-
jectively and the result is not predictable. Certainly there is a basis for such pessimism."
Patterson, supra note 19, at 854, 873.
23. For a general discussion see Jennings; Tort Liability of Administrative Officers,
21 MINN. L. Ray. 263, 271 (1937); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative
Offlcials, 12 FoaD. L. REv. 130 (1943).
24. "There is one suggestion . . . which must be rejected with scorn. It is said
that if the government is held to responsibility for breaks in canals and dams which
it has constructed, it will effectually dampen the ardor of the bureaus for construct-
ing other works. This suggestion is amoral at least." Ure v. United States, 93 F.Supp.
779, 792 (1950).
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not be hampered to the same extent as if the suits were against the
officials personally. Finally, the availability of remedies through criminal
prosecution or at the election polls are not practical or consoling to a
tortiously injured citizen. Thus, it would seem that any justification
for the discretionary function exception must be based on arguments
other than those forming the basis of the officials' immunity.
Turning to the cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act which
have considered the exception, it is noted that the courts, generally, have
failed to explain satisfactorily why the act in question was or was not
discretionary. Likewise, little is found in the opinions concerning a
possible rationale behind the exception. The decisions, at best, are
grounded upon interpretation of the statutes authorizing the act com-
plained of,2 5 and upon statements that the test will be identical with its
employment in other legal context. 26 This approach has led to applica-
.tion of the exception without considering its purposes and has resulted
in unjustifiable denials of claims.
Boyce v. United States27 typifies the factual situation and holding
in a number of the cases. There, the Corps of Engineers, while improv-
ing navigation in the Mississippi River, damaged plaintiff's property as
a result of dynamiting. Under state law the government, if a private
person, would have been liable on the theory of strict liability. The
court, however, considered the determination as to quantity and manner
of using the dynamite to be a discretionary function which fell within
the exception.2s Dicta intimated that the plaintiff could recover by
proving a negligent variance from the plans by. the actual laborers but
was without a remedy if the plans were followed. This was said to
be true, even though such plans were drawn negligently or with an
abuse of discretion. However, the case of Ure v. United States29
would seem to be irreconcilable with the Boyce holding. In the Ure
case a government constructed and operated irrigation canal had broken,
flooding plaintiff's land. The government was held liable under the rule
of Rylands v. Fletcher and it was stated that the construction of an
25. Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948); Kendrick v. United
States, 82 F.Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949) ; Old King Coal Company v. United States,
88 F.Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1948).
26. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
27. 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
28. Accord, Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); North v.
United States, 94 F.Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950); Olson v. United States, 93 F.Supp.
150 (N.D. 1950); Thomas v. United States, 81 F.Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1948). See
note 5 supra as to whether these cases are a proper result of Congressional intent con-
cerning navigation and flood control claims.
29. 93 F.Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950).
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irrigation canal was -not within the exception. Assuming there is no
valid distinction, in respect to the exception, between the planning and
construction of an irrigation canal and the planning and improving of
river navigation, the decisions in the Boyce and Ure cases are in direct
conflict.
A particularly unjustifiable result arising from the application of
the exception occurred in Denny v. United States.30 Plaintiff was an
Army officer, and by regulation, his family was entitled to hospital care
"whenever practical." An army hospital had treated plaintiff's wife
throughout her pregnancy, had assured her of care at time of delivery,
and when called on the eve of childbirth had agreed to send an ambulance.
The ambulance failed to arrive and the child was stillborn; but when
the plaintiff sued, the majority of the court held that the hospital was
under obligation to provide care only when it was practical and were
thus. exercising a discretionary function. It would seem clear, as the
concurring Judge indicates,"- that the discretion as to whether it was.
practical to treat the wife had been exercised when the authorities agreed
to care for her and to send an ambulance. This has been the logic of
several decisions, refusing to resort to the exception. Since the discretion
involved had been exercised in the causal chain leading up to the injury,
the act proximately causing the harm was merely ministerial.32
Other applications of the exception denying claims seem entirely
proper. Typical is Old King Coal Company v. United States,33 in-
volving the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to operate
plaintiff's coal mine when taken over by the government and the failure
to return the mine on plaintiff's request. The government's acts had
been' predicated upon a national emergency produced by a strike of the
miners. The court held that the statutes authorizing the acts had granted
the officials discretion'as to operation of the mines and therefore the
case fell within the discretionary function exceptiQn. 4 There is con-
siderable doubt whether such governmental action would even be tortious,
and the injury, if redressed at all, should be compensated under the well
30. 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
31. Id. at 367.
32. The courts have held the government liable for negligent acts of its hospital
employees in treating patients, even though it was discretionary as to whethe they
should be admitted to the hospital. Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Dishman v. United
States, 93 F.Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950).
33. 88 F.Supp. 124, (S.D. Iowa 1949).
34. Cf. Jones v. United States, 89 F.Supp. 980 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
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established constitutional proscription against taking without due process
of law.A
The background of the discretionary function exception, the legis-
lative history, the usages of the discretionary test in other legal con-
texts, and the early judicial applications under the Federal Tort Claims
Act have not produced a satisfactory answer as to exactly when the
exception should retain governmental immunity. The very presence
of the discretionary function exception indicates the congressional aware-
ness of the impossibility of compensation for every injury flowing from
government operations. kn attempt to make continual adjustments
between the sovereign and the individual citizen is neither expected
nor practical and would be more burdensome than beneficial to everyone
concerned. 36  However, it would seem that the courts have overextended
the discretionary immunity to instances where it was not intended and
where there is no valid justification for its existence.
Admittedly, the discretionary-ministerial test offers little, if any,
definite guide for drawing the delicate line of immunity.3 7 Few official
acts are purely mechanical. Invariably they will require some degree
of judgment and reasoning by the official performing the act. The
test may further pose insolvable problems in selecting the act upon which
the test is to operate. The most minute task may be viewed as a neces-
sary part of a larger function until an obviously discretionary responsi-
bility is found. 38 Immunity based upon a criterion so elusive must
depend largely upon the attitude of the courts. It would not seem too
"unjudicial" to urge the courts, when presented with the problem, to
seek not only an objective determination of whether an act is discre-
tionary or ministerial, but also to take into consideration the reasons-
for government immunity. Thus, in the numerous borderline cases,
where reasonable men may disagree as to the nature of the act, the court
could well weigh the considerations favoring government immunity
35. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (Plaintiff recovered
operating losses for period that government controlled mine under theory of Fifth
Amendment violation).
36. See, however, Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against The Federal Go-d-
ernment, 47 COL. L. Rnv. 722, 736 (1947), for argument that government responsi-
bility for damages should go further than for mere negligent acts and should include
a large degree of strict liability.
37. See note 21 supra.
38. E.g., the decision in the Denny case would seem to be the result of failing
to distinguish the conduct of not sending the ambulance from the discretionary func-
tion of deciding whether it was practical to admit the wife for treatment. Failure
to distinguish such acts seem contrary to congressional intent which stated that
common law torts of employees are not exempted even though such employees have
discretionary powers. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945).
NOTES
against the reasons for redressing the plaintiff's injury and characterize
the act according to the factors which seem controlling.
The most important of these considerations in respect to govern-
ment immunity is the prevention of massive and widespread claims
resulting from a single governmental act. Thus, it would not seem
that Congress intended to create liability for each individual harm result-
ing from a ruling of the price control administrator, even if such ruling
be shown to have been negligently made so as to assume a tortious
appearance. The damages in such a case would be difficult to ascertain,
would be spread over a sizable portion of the population, and in most
instances would be greatly out of proportion to the fault proved. To
waive immunity for such injuries would be to create liability "in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." 39 In effect such a consideration would advocate the use of the ex-
ception to prevent the recognition of a new type of tort arising from the
acts of government which affect a large segment of the population.4 0
The choice may turn upon whether the allegedly tortious conduct
is similar to activities performed by private individuals and to which
courts have previously attached tort liability. That is, immunity under
the exception should be reserved more readily for an act such as taking
over and controlling the nation's coal mines than for activities such
as dynamiting or the operation of a hospital. Duties in the latter
category are usually performed by personnel in the lower heirarchy of
officialdom and judicial inquiry as to the propriety of their action would
be less disrupting than calling to question the decisions of higher
officers.
A final indication may be the nature of the damages inflicted.
Although difficult to logically rationalize with the discretionary test, it
would seem that the government, with few exceptions, should be respon-
sible for tortious acts which invade tangible interests in property or
the physical person. Generally in such cases, the damages are easily
ascertained, are localized, and are likely to be commensurate with the
fault shown. There is some authority for adhering to this line of dis-
tinction. Courts have always been more zealous in their protection of
tangible interests in property and the physical person than of mere
interests of an intangible economic nature. Thus, in applying the discre-
39. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
40. The number of people affected by an act has been a limiting factor on tort
liability among private persons, particularly when the interests affected are economic.
Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) ; Ultramares v. Touche,
supra note 39; Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio Law Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d
200 (1946).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tionary test to determine the personal immunity of officials, the courts
seem to have preferred to call the act ministerial (thereby permitting
the injured party recovery) when the harm was an invasion of more
tangible interests.4 '
Continued judicial application of the discretionary function excep-
tion without reference to the fundamental bases of government immunity
may invoke Congressional amendment of the exception so as to permit
remedies where sovereign protection is unnecessary. It would seem that
the whole exception might well be removed without jeopardizing gov-
ernment efficiency and economy. As previously noted, the great majority
of claims which would validly be denied by this exception in reality
are not torts and would not create government liability even without
the exception. Either a judicial or a legislative move in this direction
would more completely assimilate the position of the citizen as against
the government to his position when suing another citizen.
COPYRIGHTING WORKS OF ARTISTIC CRAFTSMANSHIP
EMBODIED IN ARTICLES OF PRACTICAL USE
The Copyright Act of 19091 continues to pose the question of
whether Congress intended 'to protect, by copyright, artistic designs
embodied in utilitarian articles of manufacture, commonly designated as
"applied art:" The Copyright Office, in administering the statute, origin-
ally established a distinction 2 between applied art and the so-called fine
arts,3 accepting for registration only matfer considered to be fine art.4
The protection of aesthetic designs on articles of manufacture was con-
ceived to be the function of design patent. 5 However, in 1948 the
41. McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26
N.E. 100 (1891); MEcHEmI, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS
§ 642 (1890) ; Borchard, Governmenit Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129, 138 (1925) ;
Jennings, Tort Liability of -Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937);
Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 MIcH. L. Rxv. 848, 860 (1921).
1. Originally enacted as 35 STAT. 1075 (1909) and codified with amendments in
1947. 17 U.S.C. (Supp. 1950).
2. 17 CODE FED. REos. § 201.4 (1938).
3. Courts have not measured the artistic merit of a work beyond the most obvious
limits. See Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Works that are the result
of only intellectual labor generally have been held copyrightable. Jewelers Circular
Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 Fed. 932 (2d Cir. 1922); See Howell,
The Scope of Copyright Law, 4 VA. L. REV. 385 (1917).
4. 17 CODE FED. RE s. §20.1.4 (1938).
5. 32 STAT. 193 (1902), as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 73 (1946) ; 24 STAT. 387 (1887),
as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 74 (1946). "The protection of productions of the industrial
arts utilitarian in purpose and character even if artistically made or ornamented
depends upon action under the patent law .... 17 CODE FED. REos. § 201.4 (1938).
